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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 1
Tenancy by the Courtesy, Seis n necessary to create-Construction oJ
'ill-Life Estate in Land not created by Begest of Rights and Trivi-
leges in it.-In Pennsylvania a surviving husband is entitled to courtesy
of land of his deceased wife, though she had no actual possession, but only
a potential seisin during her life. If she had possession by a tenant for
years, or only the right to present possession, it is sufficient : Buchanan
vs. Duncan.
A testator, by will, provided that his widow, during her life, should
live upon the homestead farm, upon which she was to have certain rights
and privileges; as, a portion of the dwelling-house, one-half of the gar-
den, one-half of the share of the grain coming from the tenant, pasture in
summer and hay in winter, for her cow and horses, firewood, &c. He
then made a distribution of his whole estate, and after making a few lega-
cies and bequests, gave to each of his two daughters, who were both mar-
ried, the "one-half part of his real and personal estate for the use and
benefit of her legal heirs;" afterwards, and before the death of the
widow, one of the daughters, the wife of B., died, and her husband
claimed his courtesy as one-half of the farm. In an action of eject-
ment, brought by him, it was held, that the widow had not an estate
for life in the homestead farm, but only certain rights and privileges
in it: 1b.
That, subject to the provisions in favor of the widow, it descended to the
two daughters at the death of the testator, the wife of B. taking an estate
in fee simple in one undivided moiety of the farm, in which her husband
was entitled to an estate by courtesy at her death: lb.
Remedy of Wife when Rusband is one of two or more Debtors-Statute
of Limitations as to such contract-Rule as to Hearing of Exceptions not
made before Appeal to Supreme Court.-A married woman in 1845,
lent to her husband and another trading in partnership, a sum of money
on interest, out of her own separate estate. In 1857 the firm made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors. Upon distribution of the firm
1 From Robert B. Wright, Esq., State Reporter, to be reported in the 4th volume
of his Reports.
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assets, under the assignment, it was held, that she was entitled to a distri-
bution upon the amount of her note, with interest, and that her claim was
not barred by the Statute of Limitations: Kutz's Appeal.
The wife could niot maintain an action at law against the promissors,
for one of them was her husband; and if the money was held in trust,
and was not recoverable at law, the Statute of Limitations would not run
against her. The disability of coverture, in equity as well as in law,
under which she was, from the date of the note to the assignment, would
prevent the running of the statute; so that she was not barred of her
chiim in equity: lb.
Where the wife's claim was resisted before the Auditor and in the
Court below, on the sole ground that it was barred by the statute, it is too
late afterwards to object, that there was no proof that the sum loaned was
not her separate estate. She was permitted to receive and loan out the
money, and neither her husband nor the creditors claiming through him,
can object that the money loaned was not hers: lb.
Advancement, Evidence of-Expense of Educating (%lTd not pre-
sumed to be an Advanipment-Effect of Parent's Declarations.-Ques-
tions of advancement depend upon the intention of the parent, at the time
when the property is received by the child : .Miller's Appeal.
Money furnished by a parent for the educatibn of a child will not be
presumed to be an advancement, without proof that such was the inten-
*tion of the parent; for the education of a child is a parental duty ; nor is
there such a presumption where security is taken from the child for the
amount received, or where the parent attempts to preserve evidence of it
as a debt, by note, bond, book account, or otherwise: lb.
Therefore, where a parent expended money for the education of his
son, which he charged against the son, in his C1 day book," (wherein he
kept his accounts, and in which the son was credited for partial repay-
ments,) and not in a "family book," where advanced portions are usually
entered, it was hld, that the money furnished by the parent was not an
advancement, but a debt due by the son, intended to be such by the father,
when it was expended for the use of the son: lb.
Declarations by the father, made in the absence of the son, not com-
municated to him, and after most of the money had been furnished and
charged against him in a book account, that "it" was to come off from his
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CC erbsclaft or inheritance," are not sufficient to convert the existing debt
into an advancement: lb.
Advancement, charged by Testator against is Daughter-Efect of on
Claim remitted to her Rusband.-One purchased a farm from his
wife's father, during her lifetime, and having paid most of the purchase-
money, a portion of the balance due was remitted by the father, who took
a bond for the remainder; the amount thus remitted was charged to the
daughter in the "family book," as cash paid for her. After her death
her husband administered upon her estate, and upon account filed, he was
sought to be charged with the sum remitted: Held, that the transaction
did not make the husband the debtor of the wife, and that he was not
chargeable with it in administering upon her estate: Mast's Appeal.
The amount remitted by the father was- an advancement to the
daughter, though made to the husband; it was not a debt due to the wife
from the husband, for when remitted, he ceased to owe it, and the direc-
tion in the father's will, that it should be deducted from the daughter's
share, could not operate as an assignment of it as a debt against her hus-
band: lb.
The ,hasband is not chargeable for receiving the amount remitted as
his wife's money, for it was remitted directly from the father to the son-in-
law, and was not her property under the Act 11th April, 1848, so that her
husband could be responsible to her for receiving it: lb.
Action by Widow against Innkeeper .or Death of Eusband caused by
Intozication.-Acts of April 15th, 1851, May 8th, 1854, and Ayri126th,
1855, construed.-Under the Act of April 15th, 1851,-a widow may main-
tain an action for damages against an innkeeper, for furnishing her hus-
band liquor when intoxicated, in consequence of which he fell under the
wheel of his wagon and was killed : Fink vs. Garman.
That act not only regulated a common law right of action, by secur-
ing to it survivorship, but created a new and original cause of action,
unknown to the common law, in favor of a surviving widow or personal
representative, who had no right of action before: lb.
The right of action under the Act of 1851, was for the "unlawful
violence or negligence" of the defendant ; and by the Acts of May 8th,
1854, and April 26th, 1855, the giving or selling liquor to a man of
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known intemperate habits who was already intoxicated, was such "1 unlaw-
ful violence or negligence" as would render the innkeeper so doing, liable
to respond in damages for any injury causing death, at the suit either of
the -vidow, children, or parents of the decedent: lb.
After the Act of 1854, the furnishing of liquor to an intemperate
man, which was before that time unlawful under the laws of Pennsylva-
nia, would clearly be an act of "unlawful negligence," within the meaning
of the Act of 1851 : lb.
The act of the decedent in taking the liquor offered to him while
intoxicated, is not such concurring negligence in him as would relieve the
defendant from liability in damages; for it was not a responsible concur-
rence, and the Act of 1854, which makes it a misdemeanor to furnish an
inebriate liquor, does not make the drunkard responsible for accepting the
furnished liquor, nor take hny notice of his act whatever: b.
It is not the party whom the inebriate injures, only, who can sus-
tain an action for damages under the statutes; by the Act of i854, "g any
person aggrieved" may sue, and the widow is a person "1 aggrieved" by
the death of her husband, by the Act of 1855, under which she has her
action : lb.
Public policy, and the statute law of Pennsylvania alike forbid that
liquor should be furnished to one who is either at the time intoxicated, or
who is habitually intemperate, though not presently intoxicated: 1b.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
1
Specific .Performance not decreed upan Defective Title.-A court of
equity will not compel one who has agreed to purchase land to accept a
title so doubtful that it may be exposed to litigation: Richmnd vs. Gray.
A decree for specific performance of an agreement to purchase land will
not be ordered, if the vendor Could not make a good title thereto at the
time when, by the terms of the agreement, he was to deliver a deed
thereof, or for more than six months after the vendee declined to accept
a deed on account of a defect in the title; although he may be able to do
so at the time when the decreeL is sought for, or the bill filed: Id.
If one who has agreed to purchase land enters into possession thereof
1 From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter; to be published in the forthcoming
volume of his Reports.
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by consent of the vendor, and makes changes therein, by removing a cellar
wall, cutting trees and exercising other acts of ownership, before the
delivery of a deed, he will not for these reasons be compelled by a court
of equity to accept a defective title, if he abandons the possession as soon
as he learns of the defect: Id.
'Bi of Lading not conclusive as to Property not Shiyped.-A bill of
lading is conclusive evidence against the master of a vessel in favor of a
consignee, not a party to the contract, who has advanced money upon the
faith of its statements, as to the amount and condition of the property of
which it acknowledges the receipt, so far as from the whole instrument
and usage of trade the facts may be regarded as absolute statements from
the master's own knowledge; but it is not conclusive against the owners,
as to property not actually shipped, because it is not within the scope of
the master's authority from the owners to sign bills of lading for any pro-
perty. but such as is put on board: Sears vs. Wingate.
In an action by the owners of a vessel, of whom the master is one, to
recover freight for goods actually carried, delivered and accepted, the con-
signee cannot recoup in damages a loss sustained by him by reason of a
failure to deliver cargo never actually put on board, but which the master,
without other authority than belonged to him in that capacity, improperly
receipted for in the bill of lading. The proper remedy is by an action
against the master, or the consignor: 1d.
Administration, granted before Death void-Savings Bank.-A deposi-
tor in a savings bank may maintain an action to recover the amount of his
deposit, although, upon production of the deposit book, the bank has paid
the amount due to one who has been appointed as his administrator under
the erroneous belief that he was dead, after he had been absent for more
than seven years without being heard from: Jochunsen vs. Suffolk Sav-
ings Bank.
By-laws of a savings bank which provide that "upon the death of any
depositor, the money standing to his credit shall be paid to his legatee, or
heir-at-law, or legal representative," and that "it is agreed that such pay-
ment shall discharge the corporation," and that, "as the officers of this
institution may be unable to identify every depositor transacting business
at the office, the institution will not be reponsible for loss sustained where
a depositor has not given notice of his book being stolen or lost, if such
book be paid in whole or in part on presentment," and that "no person
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shall receive any part of his principal or interest without producing the
original book," will not prevent a depositor from maintaining an action
against the savings bank to recover the amount of his deposit, which,
upon production and delivery to it of the deposit book, it has paid to one
who has been appointed administrator of the depositor, under the errone-
ous belief that he was dead, after he had been absent for more than seven
years without being heard from: Id.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
1
Town, Erection dr Division of-Form of Proceedings-Regularity to
be presumed.-The question whether a town has been legally erected
may be tested in an action in the nature of a quo warranto against oeie
claiming to exercise the office of supervisor of such town: The .People vs.
Carpenter.
The act of a board of supervisors dividing a town and forming i new
one from a portion thereof, only described the dividing line: held, that the
uncertainty was cured by the reference in such act to the petition, &c.,
upon which it was founded, and from which it appeared that the new
town was to lie south of the line of division, and by proof aliunde that
the place named in the act for holding the first town meeting was south
of such line: Id.
The statute (ch. 194 of 1849) does not, it seems, require that the pub-
lished copy of notice of the application of twelve freeholders for the erec-
tion of a new town shall contain the names of such dpplicants. It is
sufficient that the notice posted should be thus subscribed: Id.
An affidavit stating that a notice was left with another person to be
posted up, "which was done," construed as a positive averment of the
posting: id.
The act of the supervisors is, it seems, one of a legislative character in
favor of the regularity of which all presumptions are to be indulged.
Those who would impeach it, have the burden of disproving a compliance
with the conditions imposed by law as a requisite to the Rxercise of the
power: 1d.
Surrogate, Jiurisdiction of-When Decree may be opened.-The effect
of the repeal in 1837 (ch. 460, § 71), of the restrictive clause in respect
I From E. P. Smith, Esq., State Reporter.
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to the jurisdiction of surrogates' courts (2 R. S., p. 221, § 1), is to restore
to such courts the incidental powers possessed by them previous to the
iRevised Statutes: Sipperly vs. Baucus.
A surrogate has the power to open a decree made by him on the final
accounting of an administrator, and to require a further account in respect
to a sum received by him with which he had charged himself, as $14.80
instead of $1480: Id.
There is no positive limitation of the period in which such application
may be made, and the lapse of four years does not of itself import
laches: Id.
Corporations-Power to Commute for Taxes, where Profits below 5 .per
cent.-The act (ch. 654 of 1853), allowing corporations which have not
received net annual profits equal to five per cent. upon their capital, to
commute for taxes is applicable only to corporations which have been in
existence for a full year before the assessment is made: The -Park Bank
vs. Wood.
Held, accordingly, that a bank which had been organized only three
months was liable to be taxed for the full amount of its capital, though
its income and profits were less than five per cent.: Id.
Wu.-A will, after bequests of two small legacies, contained the follow-
ing clauses: Third. I give and devise to my beloved wife, A. B., all my
real and personal estate, together with any and all estate, right or interest
which I may acquire after the date of this will, as long as she shall remain
unmarried and my widow. Fourth. I give and bequeath to my beloved
wife, A. B., all my household furniture, wearing apparel and all the rest
and residue of my personal property." The testator died childless. .Held,
that she is entitled to take absolutely the furniture, wearing apparel and
other personal property of the same kind, and the income, but not the
principal, of the productive personal estate during her widowhood: Jole
vs. Johnson.
Evidence -Attesting Witnes-Agencj-Ratificaton.--The execution
of a witnessed instrument which is offered in evidence by one who is a
party to it cannot be proved without calling the attesting witness, if he is
living, competent and within reach of the process of the court; and this
rule is not altered by the passage of a statute authorizing parties to testify:
Brigham vs. Palmer.
If one assumes to sell the property of another and takes in payment a
note running to himself, the owner of the property cannot sustain an
action for goods sold and delivered against the purchaser: 1d.
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Promissory NYote--Notice to Indorser.-It is sufficient to fix the liabi-
lity of the first indorser of a promissory note, if on the day of its dishonor
a duplicate notice for him was inclosed by a notary to the second indorser.
who, immediately after receiving it, deposited it in the post office, pro-
perly addressed to him; although he lives in the same town where the
note was payable and protested, and the second indorser lives in anothe!r
town: True vs. Collins.
A notice addressed to "Mrs. Susan Collins, Boston," is primo facie
sufficient to charge her as an indorser, if she lived in Boston: Id.
Action-False Representations.-The owner of land who has directed
an agent to erect a house at a particular place thereon cannot maintain an
action against a third person who, by false representations as to the true
boundary line of the land, has induced such agent in the owner's absence,
to erect the house at a different place: Silver vs. Frazier.
Accord and Satisfaction-.Promissory Note.-Payment of less than the
face of several promissory notes, a portion of which are not due, is a good
satisfaction of all of them, if upon the receipt and acceptance of the same
by the holder the notes are given up to the maker: Bowker vs. Chi17ds.
Equity-Reformaton of Written Instruments.-In order to sustain a
bill in equity to reform a deed on the ground of mistake, there must be
full and satisfactory proof that it does not conform to the oral contract as
- understood by either party: Sawyer vs. Hfovey.
-Promissory Rote- Composition.-A promissory note for the balance
dlue to a creditor of the maker, over and above the amount paid to him
under an agreement for composition, given after the maker has been dis-
charged thereby, but in fulfilment of an oral promise by which the credi-
tor was induced to sign the same, is invalid in the hands of the payee:
Howe vs. Litchfield.
Bill of Exchange-Discharge of Indorser.-f the holder of a bill of
exchange makes a valid compromise with the assignees of the acceptor,
who is insolvent, by which the proof of the claim is withdrawn and the
insolvent estate released, he thereby discharges from liability a stranger
to the bill who wrote his name upon the back of it before its delivery:
Phenix Cotton Manufacturing Company vs. Fuller.
Way.-A town is not liable'in damages to one who, while stopping in
the highway for the purpose of conversation, leans against a defective
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railing and is injured by reason of its insufficiency: Stickney vs. City
of Sale m.
Wa1-Dedication.-A -way constructed and kept in repair by a private
corporation upon its own land for its own use and convenience and the
use and convenience of tenants occupying its houses upon both sides
thereof, opening into a public street, having a sign "Private way" upon
the corner, but left open to public travel for more than twenty years
without interruption, is not thereby dedicated to the public; nor does it
become a public way by prescription: Durgin & wife vs. City of Lowell.
Corporation-Principal and Agent-Joint action of Tort against Cor-
poration and its Agents.-A joint action of tort, in the nature of trespass,
may be maintained against a corporation and its servant, for a personal
injury inflicted by the latter in discharging the duties imposed on him by
the corporation, although they might have been equally well discharged
without the use of undue or illegal force: flewett vs. Swift.
The president of a corporation is not made liable to an action for a per-
sonal injury, merely by transmitting an order of the corporation to a ser-
vant who in executing it uses illegal force; but if the order is issued by
him on his own responsibility, he is liable: Id.
Married oman.-A married woman cannot form a partnership with
her husband, and is not liable upon a promissory note given by a firm of
which, by partnership articles, she and her husband have agreed to be
members: Lord vs. Parker.
3farried Tfoman-Promissory Notes- Consideration.-If a married
woman has for her own benefit invested her sole and separate money in a
firm of which her husband is a member, an assignment by her to a third
person of her share, interest, contribution and investment in the firm is a
sufficient consideration to support an express promise to pay an agreed
price therefor; and such promise, though not in writing, may be enforced,
if she, in consideration thereof, relinquished all claim against the firm:
Lord vs. Davison.
Partnership-Dissolution 7y Death.-A surviving partner cannot be
held responsible on a contract made without his assent or knowledge by
another partner, after the firm has been dissolved by the death of one of
its members, although no notice of its dissolution has been given to the
person with whom the contract was made: MAarlett vs. Jackman.
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Promissory Note- Consideration-Stock Jobbing.-A promissory note
given in consideration of money paid by request of the maker to a broker,
for losses sustained in stock jobbing transactions negotiated by the latter
for the former, in violation of the statute, is valid; and money paid for
losses in stock jobbing transactions cannot be recovered back- Wman vs.
Fiske.
Trust-Discharge of Voluntary Trustee One who undertakes to act
as trustee of a particular fund for another, from whom he received it,
without compensation, with no beneficial interest in the fund, and with no
agreement to act for any specified length of time, is entitled to be dis-
charged whenever the further execution of the trust becomes inconvenient
to him: Bogle vs. Bogle & others; Bogle vs. Bogle.
A trustee who has mingled the trust fund with his own property, and
in rendering his account has failed to charge himself with the full sum
due from him, is not entitled to have the costs of a bill in equity instituted
by him to obtain a discharge from the further execution of the trust
allowed out of the fund; but will be charged with the payment of the
expenses of taking the account: Id.
Seaman's wages- Unlawful Discharge of Seaman-Damages.-In an
action of contract by the mate against the owners of a vessel to recover
the damages sustained from the unlawful act of the master in wounding
and discharging him in a foreign port while in the prosecution of a voyage,
upon shipping articles signed by him, the plaintiff may recover such
damages as will compensate him for the injury sustained by him in con-
sequence of the breach of the contract; and no exception lies to an
instruction by the presiding judge, authorizing the jury to allow to him
wages up to the time when he was sufficiently recovered to sail for home,
and for such further time as was reasonable for obtaining a passage, and
making a voyage to the United States, and the expenses of his board,
nursing, medicines and medical attendance until he had so recovered, and
of his passage home, although the time so embracetl was longer than that
occupied by the voyage mentioned in his shipping articles: Croucher vs.
Oakm an.
".Fraud-Sale.-Purchasing goods with an intention not to .pay for
them is a fraud which will render the sale void and entitle the vendor to
reclaim the goods from the vendee or any subsequent purchaser with
notice or without consideration) although there were no fraudulent mis-
representations or false pretences : Dow vs. Sanorn.
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Lcgitimac-Evdence.-Declarations of a deceased mother that her
child was born before her marriage, and corroborating statements by her
of the circumstances and history of her life, are competent evidence to
prove that the child was illegitimate; but evidence of a general reputa-
tion that the child was illegitimate is not competent: Haddock vs. Boston
and Maine Railroad.
Babeas Corpus-Husband and Wfe-Insanity.-A married woman
committed to an insane asylum by her husband is not entitled to be dis-
charged, on habeas corpus, if it appears that the asylum is well managed,
and she is subjected to no unnecessary or unusual restraint or improper
treatment, and her remaining there will tend to promote her recovery.
And it is immaterial that, previously to her commitment, she had con-
sulted counsel in reference to a divorce, and has since filed a libel for
divorce: Denny vs. Tyler.
Nuisance-Liability of Tenant for Years-Notice to abate.-Restoring
a structure which was a nuisance to a right of way, and which has been
abated, will render a tenant for years liable, although the structure existed
before the commencement of his tenancy; but merely refitting it after it
has been injured but not abated will not render him liable: McDonough
vs. Gilman.
A tenant for years is not liable for keeping a nuisance as it used to be
before the commencement of his tenancy, if he has not been notified to
remove it, or done any new act which of itself was a nuisance: Id.
A notice to a tenant for years to remove a nuisance which is only kept
by him as it used to be before the commencement of his tenancy must be
distinct and unequivocal, in order to lay the foundation of an action
against him for its continuance: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.J
Receiver in Supplementary Proceedings-Priority of Liens between
Credtors-Lis pendens.-In proceedings supplementary to execution the
court does not appoint more than one receiver of the property of the
judgment debtor, however numerous may be the creditors' bills or sup-
plementary proceedings against him: .MH,rick vs. Selden.
An action will not lie by one judgment creditor against another, to de-
I From the Hon. 0. L. Barbour, reporter of the Court.
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termine the question as to the priority of their respective liens upon the
equitable property of tl judgment debtor in the hands of the receiver:
Id.
The commencement of a suit in equity by the service of a summons
and injunction, creates a lispendens and a lien in the nature of an attach-
ment or a statute execution, upon the equitable property of the defendant.
But the plaintiff must prosecute his action diligently, or the lien will be
lost: Id.
Account payablie in S.pecific Articles; Demand or.Election.-If an account
is payable in specific articles, upon demand, no action will lie for the
recovery of money; nor can such account be used as a set-off, until after
a demand and refusal to pay in the specified articles, and in the mode
stipulated in the contract: Smith vs. Tiffany.
Where a creditor agrees to receive payment of his debt in lumber at
the saw-mill, or in flour, meal, &c., at the grist-mill, of the debtor, there
is no duty to pay in money, until the creditor has made his -election to
receive his pay in some of those articles, and has demanded payment
accordingly: .d.
Slander; Pleadings and Proof; Variance.-An action for slander, in
charging the plaintiff with having "stolen" property, "and carried it
away," will not be sustained by proof of a charge that the plaintiff "took"
things from the defendant, which were found in the plaintiff's possession:
Coleman et ux. vs. Playsted et ux.
Where the question submitted to the jury is, what was the meaning
and sense of the words proved, as understood at the time, all that was
said by the defendant during the same conversation, and in the same
connection, is admissible, for the purpose of giving character to the words
spoken, and showing malice: Id.
Cloud upon the Title.-Where an instrument purporting to create a
trust in respect to real estate is void upon its face, it will carry its own
condemnation with it, and will not be, in a proper and legal sense, a
cloud upon the title, which will authorize a court of equity to interfere,
to set the instrument aside: Hotchkiss vs. Etting.
The existence of a power in trust, valid in itself, and once capable of
execution, but now incapable of execution by reason of the death of the
person having the power of appointment, without an exercise of the
power, does not present a case for the exercise of the equitable power
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of the court to remove a cloud upon the title, by reason of the necessity
of resorting to extrinsic evidence to establish the extinguishment of the
power: Id.
Judgment, against whom Evidence--S t ockholders in Corporations; how
proved to be such.-A judgment against a corporation as acceptor of a
draft, is prim& facie evidence, in an action against a stockholder, to enforce
his individual liability, that the draft was properly drawn and accepted
by a duly authorized officer of the company: .Hoagland vs. Bell.
Where the name of an individual appears on the stock-book of a corpo-
ration as a stockholder, this is presumptive evidence that he is so. And,
in an action against him as a stockholder, the burthen of proving that he
is not such is thrown upon him: Id.
Action for Divorce; Right of Defendant to have Marriage annulled.-
In an action by a wife against a husband for a divorce, on the ground of
cruelty, the defendant cannot have a judgment annulling the marriage,
on the ground that the wife had a former husband living at the time it
took place, even upon the default of the plaintiff at the hearing: Linden
vs. Linden.
Partnership; Persons holding themselves out as Partners.-To enable
creditors of a partnership to recover a debt against a person as a partner,
on the ground that he held himself out as such, they must prove affirma-
tively that he did so represent and hold himself out to them; or, at least,
that they were informed of such representations before the credit was
given to the firm: Irwin et al. vs. Conklin et al.
A person not a partner in fact, will not make himself liable to creditors
for the debts of the firm, by holding himself out as a partner, unless it
appears that the creditors gave credit to the firm after such representa-
tions came to their knowledge: Id.
If there is no evidence that the creditors knew, at the time the goods
were sold to the firm, that an individual had held himself out, or suffered
himself to be held out as a partner, the latter will not be estopped from
denying his liability as such: 1d.
Innkeepers; Liability for Property Stolen.-Innkeepers are answerable
for the honesty not only of their servants, but of their guests: Gile vs.
Libby.
In an action against innkeepers by a guest, to recover the value of pro-
